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Preface 
This report is a part of a project entitled “Capturing the value of intangible assets in 
micro data to promote the EU's growth and competitiveness” — GLOBALINTO, 
with financial support from the European Commission/Research Executive Agency 
under the Horizon 2020 program. The work presented here is related to the 
deliveries under work package 3, i.e. delivery number 3.2 “Develop, validate and 
refine micro-level measures of intangibles related to owners’ business network 
participation”. 
 
Statistics Norway, 18.11.2019 
 
Jan Henrik Wang 
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Abstract 
This report attempts to seize the term relational capital, defined as an enterprise’s 
network participation.  
 
We use network analysis tools on Norwegian register data and demonstrate that 
there indeed exists a network between enterprises, through boards forming 
interconnected nodes. The network also contains many sub-networks (clusters). 
 
Opposed to most of the previous studies our data contain information on small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that the SMEs are highly network-
forming and that this sub-group of enterprises forms a network with a very lumpy 
structure, i.e., having the tendency to form clusters.  
 
We also examine how the network evolves from our starting point in 2004 to 2017 
and find that the network expands as the enterprise population increases. Both the 
number of boards and board members has increased where the former has 
increased faster, implying more boards per board member over time. 
 
Board networks can be analysed at the individual level, where the nodes in the 
network consist of board members, or at the enterprise level where the nodes 
consist of enterprises. At the individual level, we find that gender affects the 
density of networks, women having higher network density. However, this could 
possibly be an effect of women’s network being smaller than men’s network.  
 
Looking at nodes defined by enterprises, we present in chapter 5 an analysis of 
how R&D spending is related to an enterprise’s connectedness to the network. On 
the proviso that we do not know much about the mechanisms or the nature of 
causal relationships, we find that a high network connectedness has a positive 
impact on R&D spending. Most interesting, we find that this correspondence is 
particularly strong among SMEs. 
 
Our findings suggest that network participation may add value to enterprises 
through transmission of information or other incentives to increased R&D effort, 
and that board networks may represent such a channel.  
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Sammendrag 
I denne rapporten forsøker vi å gripe begrepet «relasjonskapital», definert som 
foretakenes deltagelse i nettverk, og vi undersøker om slik nettverksaktivitet kan 
utgjøre en form for immateriell kapital. 
 
Vi benytter verktøy for nettverksanalyse på norske registerdata for styremedlem-
skap og viser at styrenettverk er en realitet, ved at styrer i foretak i stor grad danner 
nettverk og klynger i nettverk. Dette synes særlig utbredt blant små og mellomstore 
foretak (SMB). 
 
Vi undersøker også hvordan styrenettverket i Norge har utviklet seg fra vårt første 
år (2004) til siste år i dataene (2017). Vi ser at nettverket har vokst betraktelig 
gjennom analyseperioden, det vil si at det ble både flere styremedlemmer, flere 
foretak som ble bundet sammen og flere styrer per styremedlem.  
 
Foruten å være forbindelse mellom foretak kan styrenettverk også studeres som 
nettverk av personer. Når vi ser på nettverket med individer som noder finner vi at 
under-nettverket av kvinnelige styremedlemmer er tettere enn nettverk bestående 
av kun menn. Dette kan delvis forklares med at det er betydelig flere menn som er 
medlem av bedriftsstyrer enn kvinner. 
 
I kapittel 5 studerer vi styrenettverket med fokus på forbindelsen mellom foretak, 
altså der foretakene er definert som noder. Med forbehold om at vi ikke kan si noe 
sikkert om virkemåten og kausalitet, finner vi at det er en klar sammenheng 
mellom at foretak har sterk nettverkstilknytning og å ha høy FoU-aktivitet. Sterkest 
er sammenhengen blant små og mellomstore foretak.  
 
Våre resultater kan gi støtte for hypotesen at informasjonsflyt og/eller overføring 
av andre ressurser via styrenettverk kan gi økt FoU-innsats i foretak. 
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1. Introduction 
Work on the measurement of intangibles has focused on broadening the 
conceptualization of what constitutes a capital investment, developing measures of 
intangibles at the macro level and more recently also at the micro level for 
individual enterprises. The latter is a central part of the GLOBALINTO project, 
which is a research cooperation between Statistics Norway and European 
collaborators which is financed by the European commission under the Horizon 
2020 programme. The aim for GLOBALINTO is “to provide new measures of 
intangible assets at the firm level, filling an important gap in measurement which 
has restricted statistical production, micro-based analysis and evidence-based 
policymaking”. 
 
Intangible assets are normally classified into three categories: 
 
• Organizational capital  
• Broad research and development assets  
• Information and communication assets (ICT). 
 
Organizational assets are accumulated through investments in management and 
marketing activities, while R&D assets are accumulated through the technical 
activities of the enterprise. Networks are related to organizational capital. 
 
Networks, if they exist, can be regarded as pathways through which information is 
shared (Larcker, 2013) or resources are being transferred. For example, board 
members with access to information about new technologies or market 
opportunities can represent a value to the enterprise on their own. Wincent et al. 
(2010) define the degree of board interlocking as a part of enterprises’ board 
capital (relational capital), along with human capital, and find that both have a 
positive influence on innovation in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Besides influencing an enterprise’s R&D and innovation, well-connected board 
members may also provide access to scarce financial resources through corporate 
network ties (Gygax et al., 2017).  
 
Skilful individuals may also be appointed as board-members after suggestion from 
external investors, who themselves are part of business networks. The existence of 
board networks and their role as information channels is documented in Akbas et al 
(2016), who finds that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders and 
financial institutions are more informed when they trade stocks of enterprises with 
well-connected board members.  
 
Boards are the central feature of a company, representing the interests of its 
shareholders. Of course, the idea that board networks may be important for an 
enterprise’s R&D policy or other managing decisions presuppose that besides their 
supervisory role, boards also have an advisory role (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 
2013). 
 
The social network literature provides well defined and standardized measures 
describing networks and nodes in networks, see for example Borgatti et al (2013). 
Attempts to measure the effect of network participation on firm performance is of 
course more faceted. One approach looks at enterprise involvement in innovation 
or R&D spending. Some studies with this perspective look at sharing of technology 
that takes place within strategic alliances (Gomes-Casseres et. al., 2006) or through 
business group affiliations (Belenzon and Berkowitz, 2010), both leading to more 
innovation activity. It should perhaps be no surprise that such formal networks like 
contracted cooperation and mutual ownership (business groups) are associated with 
  
Relational capital Reports 2019/36  
8 Statistics Norway 
coordinated R&D spending and innovation, but can more informal networks also 
play a role as information channels?  
 
Balsmeier et al (2014) find that having an outside director from other enterprises in 
the board leads to increased patenting, while Oh and Barker (2018) find that CEOs 
that also have positions as board members of other enterprises adapt the R&D 
intensity of these enterprises in the R&D efforts of their own enterprise. Helmers et 
al. (2017) focus on possible information transmission through board interlocks, 
using a difference-in-differences approach on a “natural experiment” that appeared 
from a corporate governance reform in India. They find that the treatment group, 
which experienced an exogenous increase in their network size, showed increased 
R&D and increased patenting. Similar, using a sample of listed enterprises (the 
S&P 1500 index), Chuluun et al (2017) finds that those listed enterprises with more 
extensive and central networks have more innovation.  
 
The term relational capital refers to the value to the single enterprise1 of interlocks 
to other enterprises via board networks and is regarded as a part of the enterprise’s 
intellectual capital. However, being an intangible asset, it is not easy to measure 
and even more difficult to appraise. Networks may be important for R&D intensity, 
innovation activities and access to financial capital.  
 
SMEs are much in focus for public policy both at the national level as well as in 
the context of EU and OECD, as they are regarded as a key factor in the process of 
innovation through business dynamics. A prominent example is the OECDs 
DynEmp project2. The fact that data on board membership for SMEs have so far 
not been available in many countries, to the same extent as data for listed 
enterprises, also demonstrates the importance of the results that we present in this 
report, which builds on data including SMEs. 
 
While the ultimate task in our context would be to estimate the value of networks 
as an intangible asset, our ambition in this report is restricted to the task of 
identification and characterization of board networks, using Norwegian register 
data. The main purpose of the report is to describe the formation of board networks 
in Norway over a long period. However, we also want to provide a basis for future 
research on possible effects of board networks, both for the single enterprise and to 
the society. With this task in mind, we present the results from an analysis of how 
R&D spending is related to network participation, based on register data for board 
membership matched with the Norwegian R&D survey. 
  
We describe networking among Norwegian enterprises and how the board network 
evolves over a period of 14 years, starting in 2004. Our focus is partly on 
describing the networks and how they evolve, partly on size characteristics of the 
participating enterprises that form the nodes in the network.  
 
Most of the literature on board networks employs data for publicly listed 
enterprises, where information on board membership and CEOs are publicly 
available. Consequently, the results from these works will not be representative for 
most enterprises – and certainly not for SMEs3. Our register data, that covers the 
entire population of Norwegian enterprises, allows us to use advanced network 
analysis and calculate centrality measures like the Degree centrality and 
Eigenvector centrality on data for enterprises regardless their size, localization and 
industry. 
                                                     
1And possibly its social value, through positive externalities.  
2 Criscuolo et al, 2014.  
3 Wincent et al (2010) includes SMEs, but uses enterprises’ self-reported data and must rely 
on naive measures of interlocking like the total number of links an enterprise has to others.  
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2. Data 
2.1. Dataset 
All data used in this analysis is gathered from Statistics Norway. The main data is 
from the national role register, which contains information on the professional role 
of actors in Norwegian enterprises, where data on individual identification number 
and enterprises’ organization number were used to map board members. We also 
used data from the national shareholder register and from the national accounting 
register to trim data and filter out relevant persons and relevant enterprises.  
 
From Table 2.1 we see that the network expands during our observational period. 
Given that the enterprise population increases it is not surprising that both the 
number of connected boards and board members grows. At the same time the 
former grows faster than the latter (jf. Figure 2.1), implying that number of boards 
per board member is increasing over time. 
Table 2.1 Board network sample size before trimming 
Year 
Boards and 
board members Boards Board members 
Growth rate  
boards 
Growth rate  
board members 
2004 597,485 263,845 355,340 - - 
2005 647,651 284,489 381,704 0 .078 0 .074 
2006 713,915 314,824 412,301 0 .107 0 .080 
2007 798,842 357,261 446,032 0 .135 0 .082 
2008 866,618 386,964 475,871 0 .083 0 .067 
2009 931,583 414,357 507,366 0 .071 0 .066 
2010 1,010,507 443,307 553,320 0 .070 0 .091 
2011 1,076,375 470,649 586,872 0 .062 0 .061 
2012 1,143,665 499,090 620,659 0 .060 0 .058 
2013 1,218,967 534,385 657,716 0 .071 0 .060 
2014 1,295,701 569,423 694,653 0 .066 0 .056 
2015 1,371,427 604,785 730,634 0 .062 0 .052 
2016 1,446,956 640,778 765,964 0 .060 0 .048 
2017 1,528,566 678,748 803,930 0 .059 0 .050 
Source: Statistics Norway, the role register. 
Figure 2.1 Growth in number of board members and boards. Index 2004=1 
 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
2.2. Data trimming 
A typical problem when collecting social network data from secondary sources like 
databases, is high dimensionality. Due to the networking structure, all relevant data 
must be analysed together in large matrices, or else there is a risk of distorting 
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important network structures. All choices of reducing dimensionality is therefore 
done with the research question in mind – whether networks contribute to firm 
performance. 
 
1. Because the question entails whether board composition affects firm 
performance in systematic and significant ways, we include only board 
members and board leaders from the role register. We exclude CEOs, as these 
have different roles than board leaders and board members and would thus 
carry information and assert influence in an unsystematic manner compared to 
the other two types of roles. This means that in total 6,003,216 CEOs are 
removed from the analysis and 8,220,252 board members and 6,428,006 board 
leaders are included. The distribution of CEOs, board members and board 
leaders over the period of our analysis are shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
2. Using the accounting register, we filter out inactive enterprises. Inactive 
enterprises are defined as not having any salary costs and no revenues or 
expenses in the accounting year. To fill in those enterprises that are missing 
from the accounting register, we also use the national business register as a 
secondary source, where no turnover and no employees in the given period 
means that the enterprise is inactive. Figure 2.3 shows the number of 
enterprises that is taken out of the analysis each year due to inactivity. In total, 
99,291 observations were removed from the analysis in this step.  
Figure 2.2 Role distribution 
 
1 CEOs were removed from the analysis. 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
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Figure 2.3 Number of enterprises removed from analysis due to inactivity 
 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
3. Using ownership data from the shareholder register, we filter out shareholders 
who control more than 67 % of the shares in the enterprise. This is done 
because we are interested in subtle spillovers and the ability to influence via 
independent board members, not the ability to overrule and make a unanimous 
decision on behalf of the board. By excluding majority owners with full 
control, we eliminate coordinated actions within formal business groups, i.e., 
within enterprises under full control of one and the same the same individual, 
from spillover effects within our network of independent enterprises. 
Especially the ability to capture information in one enterprise and bring it over 
to another enterprise is in our focus – that is, we are interested in the “small 
messengers”. As shown in Figure 2.4, most shareholders left in our data have 
less than 1 percent ownership in the enterprise. Kings (67 - 99%) and full 
owners (100%) are filtered out of the analysis, in total amounting to 156,145 
kings and 1,177,572 full owners for all years. As shown in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.4 Ownership distribution 
 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
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Figure 2.5 Number of owners removed from analysis due to ownership shares 
 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
4. We also exclude enterprises that have no ties to other enterprises in the sample. 
This means that board members who are only located in one board are removed 
from the data. The reason is that high dimensionality is an issue when working 
with network structures. Thus, given that we would not lose any information 
on tie-strength by removing the boards that are not connected, these enterprises 
are removed. This entails a removal of in total of 1 198 548 year-wise 
enterprises, as shown in Figure 2.6. 
Figure 2.6 Number of isolated nodes removed 
 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
After the four-step trimming explained above, the data spans from 2004 to 2017 
and contains in total 2,115,108 observations – on average 151,097 observations 
each year (cf. Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 Sample size after trimming 
Year 
Boards and 
board members Boards Board members  
Growth rate  
boards 
Growth rate  
board members 
2004 137,753 74,339 43,382 - - 
2005 125,634 71,621 40,952 0.037 -0.056 
2006 135,860 77,390 43,985 0.081 0.074 
2007 129,044 75,608 41,550 -0.023 -0.055 
2008 152,060 87,433 48,025 0.156 0.156 
2009 158,442 91,129 49,636 0.042 0.034 
2010 142,731 83,346 44,557 -0.085 -0.102 
2011 144,265 83,785 45,165 0.005 0.014 
2012 167,385 95,711 51,590 0.142 0.142 
2013 143,218 83,610 44,603 -0.126 -0.135 
2014 165,824 96,214 51,699 0.151 0.159 
2015 161,839 94,938 51,182 -0.013 -0.010 
2016 175,276 103,523 55,022 0.090 0.075 
2017 175,777 104,417 54,773 0.009 -0.005 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
2.3. Memory storage 
Social network analyses take a lot of memory and machine power. For our 
analysis, we used a server with 1 TB RAM and 64 CPU cores. This allowed us to 
store and work with network matrices in the short-term memory. The alternative 
would be to create separate codes for batching, which would have been a time-
consuming process. Unfortunately, we did not have access to a computer with a 
strong GPU, which meant that each matrix was slow to generate.  
 
A solution to the issue of machine power, was to modify the matrices so that they 
took up less space. What we were dealing with, was a set of sparse matrices, which 
are matrices defined by the fact that they contain very few non-zero elements. A 
zero in the matrix would imply no tie between boards or board members, which 
was the norm rather than the exception in our case. Sparse matrices represented by 
a 2D array leads to a lot of waste in memory storage. Thus, we converted the 
matrix into a sparse matrix and stored it in Compressed Sparse Column format. 
This led each matrix to take up significantly less space in R, thus allowing more 
efficient matrix generation and modification. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Social network analysis 
Social networks are interesting to study because many outcomes are dependent on 
collective structures and relations between actors. One actor may not be able to 
influence an outcome alone, but when his resources are placed within a certain 
network structure, he may become more influential. Firm performance may be 
dependent on whether boards are connected through common board members who 
are very well informed about trends in the market, or who possesses insider 
knowledge. 
 
Network structures are primarily composed of two units; nodes (also called 
verticles) and edges (also called ties or links). Nodes are often individuals, such as 
board members, but they can also be collectivities, such as the boards themselves. 
Some nodes are connected through a common edge, which links the nodes 
together. In this case, we say that the node is adjacent. Chains of ties between 
nodes creates a connected web that we refer to as a network. In Figure 3.1, nodes 
are the circles and edges are the lines connecting them. Analysts of networks study 
either the node level, the dyad (group of two) level or the whole network (Borgatti, 
Everett & Johnson 2013: 2). This report will present information on both node and 
network level for Norwegian boards from 2004 to 2017. 
Figure 3.1 Example of a network 
 
Source: Zachary (1977). 
3.2. Network structure 
There are two possible ways to represent network structures mathematically; using 
either graphs or matrices. The term “graph” comes from graph theory and does not 
refer to a diagram, but a mathematical object denoting a structure where some pairs 
of objects are related. An example of a visually illustrated graph is given in Figure 
3.1. Another option is to view the data as an adjacency matrix, where a zero in the 
elements indicates that two nodes are not linked, while a number indicates that the 
nodes are linked. 
 
The data can be either one-mode or two-mode. In one-mode data, we observe the 
links between the nodes directly, for example through communication, friendship 
or family ties between individuals. In two-mode data (also called affiliation data), 
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we have two sets of actors, and the connections are observed between these two 
types, not within them. Examples include students who attend a class, an activist 
attending a rally network (Borgatti et al., 2013p. 231). As is typical for network 
data collected from secondary sources, we have two-mode data for our analysis – 
in particular, board members sitting in different or common boards. This means 
that a tie cannot be interpreted as a definite sign of interaction, but an opportunity 
or increased likelihood of interaction. Data in this structure are represented as an 
affiliation matrix, consisting of individuals and the organizations they are affiliated 
to.  
 
Two-mode data can be analysed in two different ways. One possibility is to convert 
the matrix into one-mode data by multiplying the affiliation matrix by its transpose. 
In this case, the affiliation matrix becomes an adjacency matrix. This is the strategy 
chosen in this report. Boards are thus linked by sharing a common board member, 
and board members are linked by sitting in the same boards. With this type of 
structure, only one type of actor is analysed as nodes in the network at the time. 
This gives a weighted adjacency matrix where the weights indicate either how 
many board members that belong to a specific board (if boards are nodes), or how 
many boards that board members participate in (if board members are nodes)4. 
These weights can subsequently be interpreted as the strength of a tie.  
 
Converting two-mode data to one-mode data is the most conventional method for 
analysing affiliation matrices, but there is some dispute on how much information 
that is lost in analysing the data this way. Two boards can for example be equally 
strongly linked, but through very different board members. The second option is 
thus to maintain the two-mode data and create a bipartite network. Here, one 
converts the affiliation matrix to a large adjacency matrix where both rows and 
columns consist of both boards and board members. There are, however, a few 
difficulties with this approach because edges can only occur between the groups, 
not within the groups. In bipartite networks, boards cannot be linked to other 
boards, and board members cannot be linked to other board members. This means 
that one cannot find any cliques, since any edge would be linked indirectly through 
several nodes, and one would need to use modified centralization scores, since 
standard measures of centrality assume that all actors could in principle be 
connected to each other (Borgatti et al., p. 240). Everett and Borgatti (2013) have 
shown that using one-mode data when analysing networks does not necessarily 
have to entail a loss of data, as long as both conversions of the matrix – having 
both board and board members as nodes – are assessed.  
  
                                                     
4 To control for differences in board size and the frequency at which board members sit in different boards, we 
could have used a normalized score, for example by dividing the sums of the rows and columns in the affiliation 
matrix by their square roots (Borgatti et al., p. 238). A normalization score has not been used in this report for two 
reasons. First, due to the data trimming noted above, these differences have already been adjusted systematically. 
Second, normalization would obscure the network influence reflected by being a large board, or having an active 
board member, which are characteristics that may be important to improve firm performance, regardless of 
whether they reflect grouped skewedness in the data.  
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4. Descriptive statistics 
4.1. Network level 
Table 4.1 shows four measures that characterize the board network over time.5 The 
network characteristics are based on the data as described in Section 2. Thus, since 
isolated nodes were removed, the measures describe the segment of boards that are 
linked, either weakly or extensively, to other boards. It describes the part of the 
business world in Norway that is socially integrated.  
Table 4.1 Network characteristics 
Year Average degree 
Shortest  
average path Transitivity Centralization 
2004 6.778  8.697 0.830 1.133 
2005 6.065 9.222 0.858 1.062 
2006 6.361  9.241 0.863 1.254 
2007 6.358 9.443 0.830 0.825 
2008 7.382 9.087 0.882 1.610 
2009 7.734 9.104 0.883 1.575 
2010 7.451 9.410 0.879 1.378 
2011 7.808 9.483 0.898 1.592 
2012 8.354 9.227 0.909 1.889 
2013 7.834 9.601 0.903 1.679 
2014 7.926 9.521 0.878 1.461 
2015 7.551 9.870 0.866 1.368 
2016 7.869 9.901 0.880 1.571 
2017 7.979 10.049 0.884 1.615 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
The first measure – average degree – measures the cohesion of the network. 
Strongly cohesive networks are tangled, meaning that many of the nodes in the 
network have ties to other nodes. Density is the typical measure used to describe 
cohesiveness, but in large networks, density numbers can become extremely low. 
The reason for this is that density reflects the proportion of ties in the network 
compared to all possible ties. Thus, if there are many nodes that could theoretically 
have tie, but does not in reality have a tie, density is reduced to a very low number. 
This type of structure is typical for large networks where it is not obvious that the 
nodes should be linked, as in this case, where boards are, in fact, rarely linked 
through a common board member. Average degree is generally a better measure in 
large and untangled networks. The average number of ties of the nodes has risen 
since 2004, indicating that in general, enterprises in the network have gotten more 
board members in common.  
 
Second, shortest average path measures the length of the path between two nodes 
with the minimum number of edges in between. It is also called the geodesic 
distance. In our case, the graph is weighted by the number of people connecting a 
board, so that the shortest average path is the minimum sum of weighted edges 
between two nodes. It can be interpreted as an index of the time taken for 
information to travel from one node to another, provided that the information 
always travels via the shortest path. This measure has also risen since 2004, 
indicating that the nodes in the increased by time network (jf. Table 2.2) have 
become less connected, so that information travel now slower.  
 
Third, the transitivity measure reflects the clustering of the network. It measures 
the probability that the nodes which a node is connected to, also are connected 
among themselves. In doing this, it looks for triadic configurations – nodes 
organized in a triangle. Then it takes the number of transitive dyads and divides it 
by the sum of the number of transitive and intransitive dyads. This measure is 
                                                     
5 All measures in this chapter are calculated for entirely connected enterprises, i.e. the network 
without isolated nodes. The analysis in chapter 5 is provided for an extended sample of enterprises 
that also comprises not connected nodes with zero network measures for them. 
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sometimes called the “clustering coefficient”, because it reflects the extent of small 
groups in the network. The clustering coefficient has increased somewhat, i.e. from 
83 percent in 2005 to 88 percent in 2017. In general, this measure has varied little 
in the period of our analysis, i.e. between 83 and 90 percent.  
 
Fourth, the centralization measure shows the starshaped-ness of the network. In 
very centralized networks, one or a few nodes are central to the structure, having 
many ties to other nodes, which typically have fewer ties. This centralization is 
based on each node’s degree. It then takes the node with the highest number of 
edges, and subtracts all other nodes’ edge number from this, finally summing the 
numbers up. To illustrate, if the max number of edges for a node in the network 
was 10, and the other nodes in the network had 3, 4 and 8 edges respectively, the 
centralization score would be: (10-3) + (10-4) + (10-8) = 15. To make the 
comparison of the measures easier, they have also been normalized by dividing the 
values by 10,000,000. Centralization has increased throughout the period of the 
analysis, showing that the network structure has increasingly been dominated by a 
few enterprises. 
 
Overall, the network statistics tell a story of a network that has become more 
populated by board members who have several seats in different boards. Boards 
appear to be more widely spread throughout the network, as indicated by the 
increasing shortest path and transitivity. At the same time, more ties reach one 
single enterprise or cluster in the end of the 2010s than the beginning of the 2000s.  
4.2. Node level 
Node level measures are used to describe individual nodes in a network. They 
typically refer to centrality in some form, which is a property of a node’s position 
in a network. Central nodes are often interpreted as having an advantage by its 
position in a network. However, this advantage might take many forms. A node 
could for example be central by having access to a lot of information or being the 
sole source of information that goes from one actor to the next. Table 4.2 shows the 
average node statistics for each year. 
  
Degree centrality is, first and foremost, a node property. It measures the number of 
ties that a node has. A high degree centrality means that a board is connected to 
many other boards by sharing board members. As shown, boards tend to have more 
ties to boards in 2017 than they did in the early 2000s. 
 
Betweenness centrality is a measure on how often the node falls between the 
shortest path between two other nodes. It reflects how large a proportion of the 
networks’ shortest paths from one node to another that passes between the focal 
node. A high betweenness score for a board means that it often falls between the 
shortest path between two other nodes. The measure is often interpreted as the 
ability of a node to control the flow of information or playing a gatekeeping role. It 
has remained relatively stable throughout the period of our analysis, indicating that 
no enterprises have become particularly focal in information sharing. 
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Table 4.2 Node characteristics 
Year Average degree  Average betweenness  Average eigenvector centrality  
2004 6.778  92297 0.002091 
2005 6.065 78172 0.002104 
2006 6.361  81938 0.002050 
2007 6.358 70509 0.000764 
2008 7.382 87579 0.001851 
2009 7.734 91872 0.001792 
2010 7.451 78108 0.000996 
2011 7.808 77801 0.001923 
2012 8.354 96410 0.001770 
2013 7.834 70435 0.002068 
2014 7.926 88683 0.001501 
2015 7.551 86439 0.000374 
2016 7.869 95181 0.001282 
2017 7.979 92372 0.001262 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the node’s centrality in comparison to how 
central its adjacent nodes are. In the case where board A is connected to another 
board B that has a lot of ties further, board A receives a high eigenvector score. 
Thus, a board with a high eigenvector could be understood as a board who is 
connected to many well-connected boards. The eigenvector score has been reduced 
somewhat since the 2000s, but not markedly. In general, the eigenvector score 
varies a lot throughout the period of the analysis. This is because this score is 
sensitive to whether board members shift between boards. Since the score is 
calculated on whether a board member has ties to other well-connected boards, the 
score is multiplied extensively when well-connected board members are part of the 
same board. This has a significant implication on the eigenvector score (Wilmet, 
2017, p. 51). 
4.3. Visualizations 
Networks are especially well suited for visual representations. In the visualizations 
below, the dots refer to the nodes in the data, meaning the enterprises. Lines are 
edges connecting the enterprises. The thickness of the edges is the same for all 
enterprises, a choice made in order to make the plot tidier and more interpretable. 
The colours of the nodes indicate enterprise size, while the size of the nodes 
indicates the size of the boards – that is, how many board members there are in the 
board. We present her plots for board networks in 2005 and 2017, i.e. the first 
(complete) year and in the final year of the role register.6 
 
It is important to note that these graphs do not give a complete representation of the 
network structure. Nodes with less than three degrees and two edges were removed 
before generating the plot. This was a necessary step be able to generate the plot at 
all, and to make the plot interpretable. Thus, the graphs show only the most well-
connected boards. The minimum number of degrees in 2005 was 1, and the 
maximum was 159. The minimum number of edges was 1, and maximum was 13. 
This means that of 74,437 enterprises, only 1794 meet our criteria and are 
represented in the graph for 2005 (jf. Figure 4.1.). In 2017, the minimum and 
maximum number of nodes was the same as in 2005, while the minimum number 
of edges was 1 and the maximum was 16. In 2017, 2471 out of 103,922 enterprises 
are represented in the graph (jf. Figure 4.2) 
 
                                                     
6 While the data from the role register are available since 2004, the first-year data are incomplete. 
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Figure 4.1 Network structure for selected nodes, 2005 
 
1 The node size indicates size of the board. 
2 The Kamada Kawai algorithm is used. 
3 Only nodes with at least 3 degrees and 2 edges were included.  
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
Figure 4.2 Network structure for selected nodes, 2017 
 
1 The node size indicates size of the board. 
2 The Kamada Kawai algorithm is used. 
3 Only nodes with at least 3 degrees and 2 edges were included.  
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
 
The graphs utilize the Kamada-Kawai algorithm for the layout of the plot. This 
layout has been designed to perform well in large, unconnected networks (Kamada 
and Kawai, 1989). In this layout, large weights on edges results in larger distances. 
Thus, enterprises that are connected by having many board members in common, 
are located far from each other in this layout. The alternative, perhaps more 
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intuitive, would be to employ the Fruchterman and Reingold algorithm 
(Fruchterman and Reingold, 1991). However, this layout proved to be difficult to 
read and almost impossible to interpret. Thus, the Kamada-Kawai algorithm is 
chosen.  
 
Comparing Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 provide much the same information as the 
network characteristics reported in Table 4.1, even though the figures do not show 
the complete network structure. There are more lumps in the 2017 network, as 
indicated by the increasing transitivity in Table 4.1. 
 
The graphs also show that the networks are mostly comprised of small enterprises. 
These small enterprises often form clusters, where board members of small 
enterprises frequently sit in the same boards. Some of these small enterprises with 
1-9 employees have rather small boards, but this group also has the largest boards 
in the sample. Interestingly, from the graphs in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, the 
largest enterprises in terms of employees do not appear to have a strikingly central 
position.  
 
It is also interesting to look at subsets of the network to see if there are any 
differences in the network structure between size groups and between years. These 
graphs are shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 for 2005 and 2017 respectively, 
where the networks are grouped by enterprise size. The lumpy structure in the 
smallest size group becomes particularly apparent with this decomposition.  
Figure 4.3 Network structure by size group, 2005 
 
1 The Kamada Kawai algorithm is used. 
2 Only nodes with at least 3 degrees and 2 edges were included.  
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
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Figure 4.4 Network structure by size group, 2017 
 
1 The Kamada Kawai algorithm is used. 
2 Only nodes with at least 3 degrees and 2 edges were included.  
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
4.4. Board members by gender 
So far, we have focused on enterprises within the network and treated board 
members as links. However, another important aspect of the network is the board 
members, and their connectedness through their common board membership. This 
illustrates a different, but related way of looking at the network: what drives the 
formation of networks?7 Social class? Education? One relevant question to ask 
when focusing on board members, is whether men or women are more well-
connected within board networks. This is a question we briefly turn to in this 
section.  
 
As shown in Figure 4.5, there were notably more men than women in the board 
network in 2005 and 2017. However, the share of women in the board network 
increased from 18 per cent in 2005 to 25 per cent in 2017. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 
show density measures for men and women in 2005 and 2017 respectively. Since 
density can be interpreted as the probability that a tie exists between any set of 
nodes, it is no surprise that the density is very low in these large networks. 
Nevertheless, density is higher for women in both periods, showing that women 
may have higher capability to be connected by using more of their potential 
networking than men. However, this could also possibly be an effect of women’s 
network being smaller than men’s network. The capability of man and woman to 
be connected was also higher than capability of man and man to be connected in 
2005. These densities become almost equal in 2017. The fact that all densities 
decreased by the time is due to a huge increase in the network size, and hence, in 
the number of all possible connections compared to the increase in observed 
connections.  
                                                     
7 Hermalin and Weisbach (1988)  
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of the number of men and women among board members, 2005 and 
2017 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
Table 4.3 Density among gender groups of board members, 2005. 
 Men Women 
Men 10.8E-05 - 
Women 13.2E-05 58.5E-05 
Source: Statistics Norway 
Table 4.4 Density among gender groups of board members, 2017. 
 Men Women 
Men 8.1E-05 - 
Women 8.2E-05 27.5E-05 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Figure 4.6Figure 4.7 graph the network structure for board members by their 
gender in 2005 and 2017 respectively. Here, the dots indicate people who are 
sitting in boards, and the links are ties between people who sit in the same boards. 
This plot allowed for a more inclusive selection, since there were fewer board 
members in the sample. Isolates, meaning nodes with 0 degrees, were removed, 
and the nodes required 2 edges to be included, so that each of the board members 
in this plot sit in at least two boards together. Again, the Kamada-Kawai algorithm 
is used, so that nodes that lie far from each other have board members that sit in 
many boards together. The size of the node is their degree, meaning that larger 
nodes have more ties to other nodes. The colours indicate gender, where blue is for 
men and red is for women. 
 
We see that the networks are populated by mostly blue nodes, but the difference 
regarding size is not striking. Many of the well-connected female nodes have more 
degrees, indicating that some women tend to sit in many boards. The selection of 
the edge criteria may also skew these plot representations. As we saw, women have 
higher density measures, meaning that they often share a board membership with 
someone else. Thus, when people who are only connected through one common 
board membership but connected to other boards are excluded, several men might 
lose their place in the plot.  
 
The network of well-connected board members has become more populated and 
more connected from 2005 to 2017. In 2005, there were many small clusters, and 
several of these had no tie to each other. In 2017, one clear cluster of board 
members exists, and persons in this cluster have many ties far out in the network, 
meaning that they are connected strongly to other actors by having several common 
board memberships.  
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Figure 4.6 Men and women network structure, 2005 
 
1 The node size indicates size of the board. 
2 The Kamada Kawai algorithm is used. 
3 Only nodes with at least 1 degree and 2 edges were included.  
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Figure 4.7 Men and women network structure, 2017 
 
1 The node size indicates size of the board. 
2 The Kamada Kawai algorithm is used. 
3 Only nodes with at least 1 degree and 2 edges were included.  
Data Source: Statistics Norway  
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5. Application: Centrality and R&D activity 
As discussed in the introduction, board members with access to information about 
new technologies or market opportunities can represent a value to the enterprise by 
being a part of enterprises’ relational capital. Along with an enterprise’s knowledge 
and human capital, it can then have a positive influence on R&D and innovation 
activities in the enterprise. While the impact of knowledge and human capital on 
R&D input and output is well studied, the evidence on the impact of enterprises’ 
relational capital is still scarce. The examples mentioned in the introduction have in 
common that even if they find a positive correlation between network centrality 
measures and R&D activity, we cannot see that neither of them identifies a causal 
relationship. Of course, this is not an easy task, nor is this the ambition in our 
report which first and foremost has a descriptive purpose. Besides, an a priori 
assumption that a causal relation may exist, through network as pathways for 
information and transfer of resources is not implausible.  
 
Below, we present an empirical analysis based on our network data and data on 
enterprises’ R&D spending. Our research question is whether R&D spending is 
related to network participation. Like previous studies, we cannot identify exactly 
which process that drives the results. For example, we cannot say for sure whether 
networking lead to increased R&D through transfer of knowledge or if there is 
some unobserved factor that simultaneously affects both an enterprise’s centrality 
in the network and its R&D. However, we still introduce some improvements in 
the methodology compared to previous studies, namely for accounting sample 
selection bias. This is an important issue that should be considered when analysing 
enterprise R&D behaviour. Only a fraction of the enterprise population invests in 
R&D, whereas many enterprises are not engaged in R&D activities at all. 
Moreover, enterprises that already are engaged in R&D activities have a larger 
probability of doing R&D again and innovating than other enterprises do. Hence, 
regressing R&D intensity on different network measures ignoring selection 
problems may lead to seriously biased estimates. Most studies presented in the 
introduction do not take selection problem into account, while our results show that 
selection parameters are significant and cannot be ignored. 
5.1. Model for R&D input decision 
Here we describe a model for enterprise i’s decision to engage in R&D activities in 
period t. First the enterprise decides whether to start to invest in R&D in the given 
period; if it decides to invest, the enterprise then sets the amount of R&D 
investments. This statement of the problem can be modelled with a standard 
sample selection model (see Heckman, 1979): 
 
(1) 
*
1
1   if 
0   else
rd
it it it
it
rd x e c
rd
= + 
= 

, 
 
where 
it
rd  is the observed binary endogenous variable equal to zero for non-R&D 
and one for R&D-performing enterprises, 
*
it
rd is a corresponding latent variable 
that expresses some decision criterion, such that an enterprise decides to invests in 
R&D if 
*
it
rd  is above a certain threshold c, 
rd
itx  is a vector of enterprise 
characteristics (e.g. size, age, international orientation etc., and a constant term), 
1
  is the associated coefficient vector, and eit is an error term. 
 
Once an enterprise has decided to engage in R&D activities, it must set the amount 
of resources devoted to R&D investments. Analogous to the previous equation and 
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in line with the strand of literature using the so-called CDM model (Crepon et al., 
1998)8, the latent R&D intensity of enterprise i in a given period t, 
*
it
r , is 
represented as a function of another set of enterprise characteristics, 
r
itx : 
 
(2) 
*
2
r
it it it
r x  = + , 
 
where 
2
  is the associated coefficient vector, and it  is an error term. The 
observed R&D intensity, r, is then equal to: 
 
(3) 
*   if 1
0    else
it it
it
r rd
r
=
= 

 . 
 
The pair of random disturbances ite  and it  is assumed to be jointly i.i.d. normally 
distributed, with zero mean and covariance matrix given by 
 
(4) 2
  1    
  

 

 
 
 
 
, 
 
where e  and   are the standard errors of ite  and it , 1e =  by 
standardisation, and   is their correlation coefficient. This model can be estimated 
by maximum likelihood. 
 
An econometric specification for enterprise R&D input decision contains then two 
R&D equations corresponding to the theoretical model (1)–(4): 
 
(5) 
*
1
rd
it it it
rd x e= + , 
 
(6) 
*
2
r
it it it
r x  = + , 
 
where the first equation models the propensity that an enterprise with 
characteristics 
rd
it
x  engages in R&D activities. It is estimated for the whole sample 
of enterprises. The second equation focuses only on enterprises with positive R&D 
investment, R >0, and is employed to study how the R&D intensity of the 
enterprise, 
*
itr , is affected by a set of enterprise characteristics 
r
it
x . In our case both 
rd
it
x and 
r
it
x  include the measure on how well-connected the enterprise is through 
the board network. 
5.2. Additional data sources and descriptive statistics 
For the analysis, we use a rich enterprise-level panel data set based on annual R&D 
surveys collected by Statistics Norway. The enterprises included in the surveys 
constitute a large and representative sample of the Norwegian private sector. The 
                                                     
8 The standard version of the CDM model is a structural model that studies the following interrelated 
stages of the innovation chain: the choice by an enterprise of whether or not to engage in R&D; the 
amount of resources it decides to invest in R&D; the effects of these R&D investments on innovation 
output; and the impact of innovation output on the productivity of the enterprise. In this report we test 
only the possible impact of being well-connected through the board networks on the enterprise’s 
R&D decision retaining the deeper analysis for further investigation. 
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enterprises with 10–50 employees are selected using a stratified sampling method 
based on industry classification (SIC 2007 codes) and enterprise size, whereas all 
enterprises with more than 50 employees are included. These data are then 
supplemented with information on board network measures from the dataset 
described above. For the analysis, we also include the “isolated enterprises”, i.e. 
those enterprises that are not connected to others through the board network and set 
all network measures for them to be equal to zero. Excluding enterprises with 
incomplete information on key variables (very few observations) or with extreme 
observations for R&D intensity (1 percent from each side), we obtain an 
unbalanced panel of 34,398 observations on 7,813 enterprises.  
 
We use the following enterprise characteristics in the analysis: 
• Centrality indicator (eigenv_top10): a dummy variable indicating whether 
an enterprise is in the upper decile of the distribution of eigenvector 
centrality for the given year. 
• R&D investment (R): R&D investment as it is reported in the 
questionnaire, deflated by the R&D deflator used in the national accounts 
(using 2005 as a reference year). 
• R&D intensity (r): is the R&D investment per employee, R/L, where L is 
the number of employees. 
• Positive R&D history (d_lag_rd): a dummy variable indicating whether an 
enterprise has carried out R&D in the previous year. 
•  Enterprise size: a set of dummy variables indicating the enterprise size, i.e. 
0-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-149 or 150 employees or more. The latter category 
(large enterprises) is the reference category. An alternative measure log(L), 
where L is the number of employees, is used for checking the robustness of 
the results. 
• Enterprise age: a set of dummy variables indicating the enterprise age, i.e. 
0-2, 3-5, 6-9, 10-15 or 16 years old and older. The latter category (mature 
enterprises) is the reference category. 
• Enterprise industry: a set of dummy variables indicating the enterprise 
industry at the industry group level. Manufacturing (code 10-33 in 
SIC2007) is the reference industry. 
• Year: a set of time dummies indicating the year of the R&D survey; 2005 
is the reference year. 
 
Distribution of the final sample across enterprise size groups, age groups and 
industries are provided in Figure 5.1-Figure 5.3 respectively. From Figure 5.1 we 
observe that compared to the distribution of the initial sample of enterprises that is 
solely based on the role register and includes “isolated enterprises”, the very 
smallest enterprises (with 0-9 employees) are poorly covered by R&D survey data. 
This is not a surprise given the survey structure. However, more than half of our 
final sample comprises small (10+) enterprises that gives us opportunity to study 
the impact of well-connectedness for this group with high confidence. The fact that 
data on board membership for SMEs have so far not been available in many 
countries also demonstrates the importance of the results that we present further. 
 
As to other enterprise characteristics, mature enterprises and enterprises in 
Manufacturing (10-33 in SIC 2007) are overrepresented in the final sample while 
young enterprises and enterprises in Other services (68-82 in SIC 2007) are 
underrepresented. Other age and industry groups are well-represented in the final 
sample (jf. Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.1 Distribution of enterprises in initial and final sample by enterprise size 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
Figure 5.2 Distribution of enterprise-year observations in initial and final sample by enterprise 
age1 
 
1 We use enterprise-year observations instead of enterprises for calculation of shares here since enterprise age 
changes from year to year and many enterprises are presented only in some years in the R&D survey during the 
observational period.  
Source: Statistics Norway 
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Figure 5.3 Distribution of enterprises in initial and final sample by enterprise main industry 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
We can see that mean degree centrality over all periods is increasing by enterprise 
size in both samples. The same is the case for betweenness centrality measure. 
These findings are expected since larger enterprises tend to have larger boards that 
potentially leads to higher degree and betweenness.  
 
Mean eigenvalue centrality is also increasing by enterprise size in the final sample, 
while this is not the case in the initial sample. The main reason for such behaviour 
is that eigenvector centrality of a node is influenced by the eigenvector centrality of 
all the adjacent nodes, such that a node that is connected to other well-connected 
nodes will have a higher eigenvector centrality. This node will in its turn increase 
the eigenvector centrality of its adjacent nodes. This feedback triggers what can be 
called a snowball effect. That implies that even a very small board can have a high 
eigenvalue centrality if any of the board members is sitting in other boards with 
high eigenvalue centrality. This measure is very volatile among small enterprises in 
the initial sample. By having relatively few of the smallest enterprises in the final 
sample we obtain more stable mean values for eigenvalue centrality. 
 
As to other enterprise characteristics, more mature enterprises have higher values 
of centrality measures than young enterprises. That is not surprising since it takes 
time to establish new relationships. Enterprises in Financial service activities (64-
66 in SIC 2007) are leading in all centrality measures. 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of our centrality measures for Norwegian 
board network by enterprise size, age and industry both in the initial and the final 
sample.  
 
We can see that mean degree centrality over all periods is increasing by enterprise 
size in both samples. The same is the case for betweenness centrality measure. 
These findings are expected since larger enterprises tend to have larger boards that 
potentially leads to higher degree and betweenness.  
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Mean eigenvalue centrality is also increasing by enterprise size in the final sample, 
while this is not the case in the initial sample. The main reason for such behaviour 
is that eigenvector centrality of a node is influenced by the eigenvector centrality of 
all the adjacent nodes, such that a node that is connected to other well-connected 
nodes will have a higher eigenvector centrality. This node will in its turn increase 
the eigenvector centrality of its adjacent nodes. This feedback triggers what can be 
called a snowball effect. That implies that even a very small board can have a high 
eigenvalue centrality if any of the board members is sitting in other boards with 
high eigenvalue centrality. This measure is very volatile among small enterprises in 
the initial sample. By having relatively few of the smallest enterprises in the final 
sample we obtain more stable mean values for eigenvalue centrality. 
 
As to other enterprise characteristics, more mature enterprises have higher values 
of centrality measures than young enterprises. That is not surprising since it takes 
time to establish new relationships. Enterprises in Financial service activities (64-
66 in SIC 2007) are leading in all centrality measures. 
Table 5.1 Centrality measures by sample and enterprise characteristics. Mean values 
Enterprise characteristics Degree 
Initial sample 
Eigenvalue 
Between-
ness Degree 
Final sample 
Eigenvalue 
Between-
ness 
Enterprise size       
0-9 empl. (S_0_9) 4.43 0.000997 41695 3.99 6.66E-07 95610 
10-19 empl. (S_10_19) 4.53 0.000758 65725 4.65 5.84E-06 117051 
20-49 empl. (S_20_49) 7.34 0.001438 115790 6.14 1.13E-06 149675 
50-149 empl. (S_50_149) 8.62 0.000082 222987 8.02 0.000040 240174 
150+ empl. (S_150plus) 9.64 0.000094 439764 9.78 0.000051 476611 
Unknown 6.50 0.001494 59886 - - - 
Enterprise age       
0-2 years 4.33 0.000338 33977 6.53 2.47E-07 147899 
3-5 years 5.06 0.000681 48333 6.78 1.54E-06 198683 
6-9 years 5.47 0.001621 56319 6.84 1.68E-06 219814 
10-14 years 4.72 0.001052 57690 6.95 7.72E-06 236556 
15+ years 4.33 0.001027 63657 6.57 0.000034 207581 
Enterprise industry (SIC 2007 code)     
Manufacturing (10-33) 3.86 3.80E-06 60684 6.20 0.000014 139556 
Construction (41-43) 4.46 0.000115 39536 6.07 8.53E-09 133563 
Wholesale and retail trade (45-47) 2.95 4.59E-06 20420 5.56 9.96E-08 108666 
Transport and post (49-53) 6.44 0.000032 74023 8.52 1.68E-06 232952 
ICT (58-63) 3.32 0.000016 73043 6.54 3.85E-06 248437 
Financial services (64-66) 6.11 0.002645 107025 9.21 0.000186 729734 
Other services (68-82) 5.76 0.000468 48826 5.73 0.000060 229327 
Other industries 4.46 0.003505 80938 9.06 3.42E-06 336508 
Source: Statistics Norway 
5.3. Identification strategy and empirical results 
One important issue that should be considered when analysing enterprise R&D 
intensity is the possibility of sample selection bias. Only a fraction of the enterprise 
population invests in R&D, whereas many enterprises in the sample are not 
engaged in R&D activities at all (only 33 per cent of the observations in our final 
sample have positive R&D values). In line with the many CDM empirical studies, 
we correct for the selection bias by estimating (5) and (6) as a system of equations 
by maximum likelihood, assuming that the error terms in (5) and (6) are bivariate 
normal with zero mean and covariance matrix as specified in equation (4). In the 
literature, this model is often referred to as a Heckman selection model (see 
Heckman, 1979) or type II Tobit model (see Amemiya, 1984). 
 
For identification of such a model, the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑑 in equation (5) should contain at 
least one variable that is not in the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑟  in equation (6). Nevertheless, most 
previous works in the CDM literature use the same explanatory variables in both 
equations. The main reason for this practice is that it is difficult to find the factors 
explaining an enterprise’s likelihood of engaging in R&D that are not related to the 
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amount of resources the enterprise decides to invest in R&D. Following Rybalka 
(2015), we use here a dummy variable for the enterprise’s previous R&D 
investment (whether an enterprise had an R&D activity in the previous year) as an 
exclusion restriction.9 The main results are presented in column (1)-(2) of Table 
5.2. In addition to this exclusion restriction we use the optional identification by 
functional form to check the robustness of the results. We then include 
employment (log) and employment squared (log) instead of set of size dummy 
variables, cf. column (3)-(4) of Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Estimation results for impact of network well-connectedness on enterprise R&D 
input decision 
Variables1 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: R&D expenditures per employee (log)   
eigenv_top10 0.048  0.071*  
eigenv_top10 x S_0_9  0.116  0.033 
eigenv_top10 x S_10_19  0.165**  0.168** 
eigenv_top10 x S_20_49  0.246***  0.331*** 
eigenv_top10 x S_50_149  -0.062  -0.121* 
eigenv_top10 x S_150plus  -0.004  0.084 
S_0_9 2.473*** 2.436***   
S_10_19 1.858*** 1.814***   
S_20_49 1.259*** 1.194***   
S_50_149 0.385*** 0.396***   
Employment (log)   -1.603*** -1.528*** 
Employment squared (log)   0.115*** 0.108*** 
     
Dependent variable: Dummy for R&D>0  
eigenv_top10 0.045**  0.038*  
eigenv_top10 x S_0_9  -0.022  -0.094 
eigenv_top10 x S_10_19  0.164**  0.172*** 
eigenv_top10 x S_20_49  0.090*  0.078* 
eigenv_top10 x S_50_149  -0.034  -0.027 
eigenv_top10 x S_150plus  0.094**  0.068* 
S_0_9 -0.505*** -0.469***   
S_10_19 -0.332*** -0.332***   
S_20_49 -0.277*** -0.268***   
S_50_149 -0.191*** -0.148***   
Employment (log)   0.034 0.078 
Employment squared (log)   0.008 0.004 
     
Exclusion restriction:     
Positive R&D history 2.504*** 2.503*** 2.498*** 2.497*** 
Chi-square for selection 606.71 607.00 651.75 646.33 
Correlation coefficient rho -.556*** -.557*** -.570*** -.567*** 
Log likelihood -37383.08 -37362.27 -37289.27 -37248.29 
Number of obs. (uncensored) 34398 (15415) 34398 (15415) 34398 (15415) 34398 (15415) 
1 All regressions include a constant, dummies for enterprise age, industry, and time dummies. Reference group: year 
2005, Wholesale and retail trade industry (45-47 in SIC 2007), mature enterprises (15 years old or older). Models (3)–
(4) differ by using employment (log) and employment squared (log) instead of the set of size dummies. All models are 
estimated by maximum likelihood using the Heckman procedure in Stata. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in Table 5.2 support the presence of selection bias with a highly 
significant estimate of the correlation coefficient, i.e., 𝜌, around -0.56 in all model 
specifications. As expected, the R&D investment history variable has a high 
positive impact on the propensity to invest in R&D, indicating the extent of 
persistency in the enterprises’ R&D policy. We also observe that coefficients for 
enterprise size indicators are increasing with enterprise size implying that larger 
enterprises invest more often in R&D than smaller enterprises. However, R&D 
intensity is decreasing with enterprise size implying that if small enterprises invest 
in R&D, their investment per employee is higher than in the large enterprises. 
                                                     
9 On the one hand, enterprises that have previous R&D experience have a higher probability of 
engaging in R&D activities in the given period since both R&D and innovation have a high degree of 
persistency (jf. Peters, 2009). On the other hand, it is not obvious that having R&D experience 
implies higher R&D intensity in the given period (it can happen that “new” R&D investors, or 
enterprises that took a break from investing in R&D, invest more intensively in R&D in the given 
period than enterprises that invest continuously). The correlation between the Positive R&D history 
variable and the dummy for positive R&D in the given year is 0.80, while the correlation with the 
R&D intensity variable (𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ ) is much lower and equal to 0.27. 
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The key variable of our interest in this analysis is an indicator of well-
connectedness, i.e. eigenv_top10. It indicates whether the enterprise is among 
enterprises in the upper decile of distribution of eigenvalue centrality values. We 
choose eigenvalue centrality from the three earlier presented centrality measures 
because we believe that it reflects best the potential for faster knowledge spill-
overs and information flows in the network. This variable is positively correlated 
with both the probability that the enterprise is engaged in R&D and the R&D 
intensity. The variable is more significant in the selection equation than in the 
equation for R&D intensity (cf. columns (1) and (3) in Table 5.2). However, when 
we consider the impact of being well-connected by enterprise size (cf. columns (2) 
and (4) in Table 5.2), we obtain positive and highly significant results for SMEs 
(10-49 employees). This result is robust for both model specification and implies 
that being well-connected through board network has higher impact on R&D 
activity of an SME. 
6. Conclusions 
In this report we attempt to seize the term relational capital and we examine 
whether (or to what extent) board networks may constitute a part of enterprises’ 
intangible capital. To serve as an intangible asset, two criteria must be met: 1) A 
network (and eventually sub-networks) between board members via shared 
positions must actually exist, and 2) participation in such a network must have a 
value; to the single enterprise and thus to the society (directly, by increasing value 
added in the enterprises involved and indirectly through positive externalities).  
 
In chapter 4 we use network analysis tools on Norwegian data and demonstrate that 
it indeed exists a board network with interconnected nodes. This network also 
contains clusters or sub-networks, particularly among SMEs. 
 
We also examine how the network evolves from our starting point in 2004 to 2017 
and finds that the network expands as the enterprise population increases. Of 
course, an expansion of the network increases the number of nodes and all possible 
connections between them. The number of observed connections does not increase 
to the same extent, leading to lower density in the network. 
 
Compared to previous studies that rely on data for publicly listed companies, we 
can use register data for the entire population of Norwegian enterprises. This 
enables us to include SME’s, which are believed to be of importance for innovation 
and economic growth. Very interesting, we find that this category of enterprises 
indeed is network-forming, with a lumpy structure.  
 
We will point at several possible research topics related to the formation of board 
networks that are not addressed here. One is the determinants of individual network 
participation through board membership. We show that gender, as an example, 
affects the density of networks, women having higher network density. However, 
this could possibly be an effect of women’s network being smaller. Other 
approaches focusing on individuals as network nodes could be to examine the 
background of board members compared to others. Have they been attending the 
same school or university? Possible effects of social class and gender? Same 
municipality? 
 
Looking at the network with nodes defined by enterprises, we present in chapter 5 
an analysis of how R&D spending is related to the enterprises’ network 
connectedness, measured by centrality measures. On the proviso that we do not 
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know much about the mechanisms, or the nature of causal relationships, we find 
that high network connectedness does have a positive impact on R&D spending. 
Most interesting, we find that this correspondence is particularly strong among 
SMEs.  
 
To conclude; yes, the board network exists, and the strength of enterprises’ 
network connection is associated with higher R&D spending, which is important 
for innovation and economic growth. Hence it should be counted for as an 
important part of enterprises’ intangibles.  
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